

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

ROUGH GOING IN '64

A First Look at Drive on Washington

by Gary Gillette and Alexis Turkalo

This time we're pretty quick off the mark — getting an article written before a game is actually published so that it can appear in the same time frame as the game. Along with *Pea Ridge*, *Drive on Washington* is part of our series, *Great Battles of the American Civil War*, in which all of the games are based on the ever-popular *Terrible Swift Sword* system. If you folks buy these items, we'll continue and do an entire shelf-full (witness *Wilson's Creek* in the upcoming issue of *S&T*).
—Redmond

The simulation of the Battle of the Monocacy in SPI's recently-published *Drive on Washington* presents the opposing players with many of the same problems that faced Generals Early and Wallace in the event. As in most Civil War battles, confusion was the order of the day as the outnumbered Union forces attempted to delay the battle-weary veterans of Early's command so that reinforcements could be sent to man the defensive positions around Washington, D.C. So that confusion is not the order of the day for the players of *Drive on Washington*, two battle-weary playtesters of the game here offer some pointers on strategy and tactics of this little-known battle as represented by the game.

The aspect of the game that makes it most interesting is the relative vulnerability of the two forces; both players are presented with tough problems and hard decisions, yet both are so weak in key areas that disaster is always a distinct possibility. This analysis is reflected by the outcome of the actual battle. Although Early managed to smash the Union and force a general retreat late in the day, Wallace had sufficiently delayed Early to allow Grant to send troops to Washington. Further, Early's command was severely weakened by the battle and probably could not have overcome the capital's defenses even if they had not been reinforced. While Early had caused great consternation in the North, he had reached the zenith of his campaign at the Monocacy and would pose little threat from that time onward.

A comparison of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Union and Confederate forces in *Drive on Washington* is illuminating. Major General Lew Wallace, nominally in command of the 1st Separate Brigade and Ricketts' division, is on the defensive and has only to stop the Confederates from crossing the Monocacy and/or clearing the Washington Pike before

the end of Game-Turn 15 in order to be assured a victory. Though his troops are fewer in number than the enemy, his units are larger, his morale is much higher, his ammunition resupply is adequate, his subordinate commanders are effective (as is Wallace himself), his weapons are good (some of his units are armed with Colt repeaters, and he has three highly effective mountain howitzers), and the terrain plus the entrenchments at Monocacy Junction ensure that any Confederate attack will be costly. Moreover, the river can be crossed only at five sites — the Stone Bridge, Crum's Ford, the Railroad Bridge, the Wooden Bridge, and the "hidden ford."

With all these advantages, what is the problem? Simply this: Wallace has too few units to adequately guard all the potential crossings, so he is extremely vulnerable to being flanked, surrounded, and destroyed in detail. If even one Confederate division can cross the river in force, the defenders can find themselves in a disastrous position.

By contrast, the Confederate units of Lieutenant General Jubal Early seem to lack all the requisite factors for a successful attack. The Confederate regiments are low in strength and have equally low morale, their weapons are poor (several regiments are armed with smoothbore muskets), their ammunition resupply is very limited, and their leaders and commanders are of low caliber (reflected by the rules for Confederate Limited Initiative and the low Brigade Combat Effectiveness ratings for the Confederate commands). The only significant advantages that the Confederate player possesses are his greater number of units and his consequent ability to threaten the Union positions at more points than can be effectively defended. Given these parameters, the Confederate player may find that his performance improves greatly with repeated playings of *Drive on Washington* — a blowout in his first game or two is not necessarily indicative of the actual game balance when more experience has been acquired.

Set-Up and Initial Considerations

Since the Union player does not know the Confederate plan of attack, he must guard both Crum's Ford and the Stone Bridge with substantial numbers of troops from the 1st Separate Brigade. Fortunately, this is made possible by the presence of two leaders for the brigade, Brigadier General Tyler and Lieutenant Colonel Clendenin. He should place the 1st Maryland Regiment at

one of the above crossings (with either Tyler or Clendenin stacked with the regiment) and place the 149th Ohio Regiment at the other crossing with the remaining leader. The presence of these units in the crossing hexes (1530 and 0739) makes it relatively unlikely that the Confederate player can successfully melee across the ford or the bridge due to the high strengths of these regiments, and the possibility of a rout is reduced to almost zero by their high morale and the presence of the leaders. This latter point is especially true if the Union player stacks the 144th Ohio with the 1st Maryland.

The rest of the 1st Separate Brigade should be distributed between the ford and the bridge according to the perceptions of the Union player as to the likely attack points. The 159th Ohio Cavalry Regiment and the Loudoun Rangers are excellent choices for a mobile reserve which can be rushed to either the ford or the bridge according to the Confederate threat. In fact, these units can be switched between the two crossings with ease at any time during the game. The Union player has no choice in the deployment of the regiments in Ricketts' division except for their arrangement in the entrenchments at Monocacy Junction.

Once again, a regiment with a morale of "5" and a high strength should be placed in the crossing hexes at the Junction, stacked with a leader for insurance (the 106th New York Regiment and the 110th Ohio Regiment are ideal choices for these assignments). Ricketts, Truex, or McClellan should be placed in hex 1917 and Major General Wallace in hex 2214. It is highly advantageous to the Union to burn the Wooden Bridge as soon as possible after the start of the game, as this reduces the number of possible crossing points and frees troops for the eventual defense of the wheatfield.

Placing Wallace in hex 2214 exposes him to possible Confederate fire until the bridge is burned, but this small risk is outweighed by his effect on increasing the die roll range for burning the bridge. Once this is accomplished, Wallace can be moved to a safer location, although he is usually needed in the Monocacy Junction area later in the game when the fighting is at its peak.

The Confederate player must decide before the game how he will execute his attacks across the river and position his units accordingly. Rodes' Division can force a crossing at either the Stone Bridge or at Crum's Ford at high cost, but it cannot do both. Ramseur's Division can attack across

the Railroad Bridge or Crum's Ford. Having Rodes and Ramseur attack at separate crossings keeps the Union player from concentrating his forces; it also means that the attempted crossings will almost surely result in heavy casualties to the assaulting brigades and the probable loss of Brigade Combat Effectiveness for most of the brigades in Rodes' and Ramseur's Divisions.

Combining these two divisions at Crum's Ford allows one to be held in reserve to exploit any crossing that is made with relatively fresh troops; however, it also allows the Union player to mass his powerful units at Crum's Ford and leave only token forces at the Stone Bridge and the Railroad Bridge.

Attacking at Monocacy Junction with Ramseur's Division should be coordinated with Gordon's attack through the wheatfield to put maximum pressure on Ricketts' division. Whatever plan is selected, the Confederate player should attempt to disguise his intentions for as long as possible from the Union player by detaching brigades from Ramseur's and/or Rodes' Divisions to demonstrate in front of the other crossing points which he will not attack. Once the Union player accurately divines the Confederate plan of attack, though, these detached brigades should be returned to their command so that Confederate Limited Initiative does not take effect any earlier than necessary for these divisions.

The Confederate artillery batteries should be massed at one location in order to have maximum effect. This can be either at the Monocacy Junction or at Crum's Ford. Since the Confederate ammunition supply is limited, the artillery should probably be used against Union infantry regiments and not be used in counter-battery roles. When properly positioned on the hills east of the Monocacy River, Union artillery is relatively invulnerable to counter-battery fire, and it would be a waste of valuable ammunition for the Confederate player to engage in it.


General Early and the First Confederate Moves

Because of the location of General Early's arrival, the Confederate player should activate Rodes' Division first, then Ramseur's Division, and lastly Gordon's Division. To activate these divisions in any other order would just stall the eventual Confederate attack in the north at the Stone Bridge or at Crum's Ford. By the time Early activates Gordon's Division, McCausland's cavalry should have found the ford; if not, Early should be immediately sent to aid in the search. Once this "hidden ford" is discovered, McCausland's units should be sent in a wide flanking maneuver around the Union lines to threaten the rear of the entrenchments at Monocacy Junction and to look for stray artillery batteries and supply wagons to capture. These cavalry units are also very helpful in surrounding the Union line of defense at the wheatfield.

If Ramseur's Division has been sent to attack across the Railroad Bridge, it should

do so simultaneously with Gordon's advance through the wheatfield and McCausland's rear-area harassment. If this plan is well executed, Truex's and McClellan's Brigades should be overwhelmed and the Washington Pike cleared. The real problem here is time; all of this must be done before the end of Turn 15. It is not critical that Rodes cross the river in the north if this happens, but he must pin all the units of the 1st Separate Brigade at either Crum's Ford or at the Stone Bridge. Any Union reinforcements sent from the 1st Separate Brigade to the Monocacy Junction can prevent Gordon and Ramseur from succeeding. If Ramseur's Division is sent to Crum's Ford, then either Ramseur or Rodes must force a crossing of the river in order for Gordon to succeed.

The Union player's position in the early stages of the game is basically reactive: he must discern the Confederate plan of attack and shift his troops to the most threatened areas. He can do little about McCausland's flanking maneuver, since he will not have enough units to prevent it unless he can send some regiments from the 1st Separate Brigade south to help Ricketts' division.



The Union artillery batteries should be located in only four hexes during the game — 0638, 1329, 1819, and 1914. These hexes are ideally positioned so that the artillery can pour devastating short-range fire over the heads of the Union troops below into any Confederate troops massing to cross the river or already across the river. The only time that the artillery should be located elsewhere than these hexes is when the Union is flanked or when the artillery is threatened with capture by McCausland's cavalry. The Union artillery can be shifted from one position to another with some difficulty if the Union player can identify the main Confederate attacks soon enough.

Other than these reactions, the only major decision for the Union player is where he

should set up his defensive line to protect the Washington Pike from Gordon. While the tactic of sending a brigade into the wheatfield to set up a forward defense at the stream and fence in the 26xx hexrow (or at the "hidden ford" itself) is appealing, it usually results in a total loss of this brigade to Gordon's Division without seriously delaying the Confederates. This is due to the ease with which McCausland can encircle such a defensive position while Gordon launches a frontal attack.

The best place to set up a defensive line is along the stream and fence at the east edge of the wheatfield and in hex 1907. This forces McCausland to circle far to the south to flank the Union line. More importantly, it allows the defense to use the entrenchments in hexes 2214 and 2314, where a last-ditch stand should be made when Gordon overruns the defensive line, since these entrenchments qualify for masking the Washington Pike if units remain in them.

The most serious drawback to such a defensive line is that Ramseur's troops and/or the Confederate artillery at Monocacy Junction can enfilade this line from across the river. Unfortunately, the Union player will have to live (or die) with this since it is unavoidable. Because of Wallace's special abilities, he should be positioned with the Union troops at the point of greatest pressure. This will usually mean that he will end up with the troops defending along the edge of the wheatfield.

Non-Conclusions

Once the Confederate player puts into action his attack plan and the Union player re-allocates his units, the course of the game is determined for better or worse for each side. Fierce fighting will always accompany any Confederate attack, since the critical hexes fought over are so few. Confederate fire at Union units in entrenchments is largely ineffective unless concentrated in large volumes; in general, artillery fire by itself will have no effect on units in entrenchments.

Confederate crossings at bridges and fords can be attempted in two ways. The attacker can mass his units in front of the Union units across the river, take his casualties from the Union rifle and artillery fire, and hope that enough of his units remain at the end of the turn to successfully melee across the bridge or the ford. Alternatively, the Confederate can mass his units at two-hex range from the defenders and attempt to weaken them sufficiently by exchanging fire until he can rush them late in the game.

Early should be sent to the first division to reach Limited Initiative so that its attack does not stall. When a second division reaches CLI, the Union position must be seriously weakened, or else the Confederate attacks will fail. The Union player must fight to the death for the crossing hexes and for the Washington Pike or else he will find himself decisively defeated by the Confederate player.

If both players play with skill and tenacity, the battle will result in heavy casualties, but the outcome will probably be in doubt until the last turn of the game. No conclusions about the result of most individual games can be reached, since the outcome depends on the relative skill of the players battering each other over a few precious hexagons. That is what makes *Drive on Washington* so fascinating and such a tense game and excellent simulation.

Extra Scenario and Optional Rules

While *Drive on Washington* represents the actual forces engaged in the Battle of Monocacy, there were other units potentially available for combat that were not committed to the battle. On the Union side, several regiments of Ricketts' Division were expected to arrive throughout the day of the battle, and this kept Wallace wondering and worrying. On the Confederate side, General Breckenridge's motley command of troops was held in reserve guarding the Confederate supply trains, but it could have been committed to action by Early. To represent these forces, the following Order of Battle is listed and the following special rules are suggested. It should be noted that this scenario has not been playtested and the commitment of these troops on either side could drastically alter the balance of the game.

Union Order of Battle

(the "missing" regiments of Ricketts):

6th Maryland Infantry/McClennan's Brigade/
R4-Strength/4-Morale.

67th Pennsylvania Infantry/McClennan's
Brigade/R4-Strength/4-Morale.

122nd Ohio Infantry/McClennan's Brigade/
R5-Strength/4-Morale.

Special Rules for Union Reinforcements

1. The 122nd Ohio Infantry Regiment has a strength of "5" only when combined with the 122nd Ohio Regiment already on the map. Otherwise, the reinforcing unit has a "3" strength counter placed under it (this represents 3 companies of the regiment that had gotten separated somehow in the move to the Monocacy). Both units of the 122nd may operate separately on the map, but the Union player may combine them at any point in which they occupy the same hex during the Union final Command Phase. If either unit is routed, combination may not occur. If either unit has taken losses before combining, the strength of the combined regiment is correspondingly reduced. Once combined, they may not be separated.

2. If the Union reinforcements are received, the Brigade Combat Effectiveness Level of McClennan's Brigade is changed from 9 of 15 to 16 of 26 Strength Points lost or out of ammunition.

3. The Union reinforcements are received on the next turn after Game-Turn 9 in which the Union player has successfully rolled the die for them. The Union player may roll one die in his final Command Phase starting on Game-Turn 9; on a die roll of "1," the Union

reinforcements enter in the next Union Movement Phase on hex 0105 in column formation. Alternatively, the Union player may delay the entry of these reinforcements once he has received them. If he delays their entry by two turns (i.e., three turns after the successful die roll), they may enter in hex 0123, 0134, or 0138.

Confederate Order of Battle

(for Breckinridge's command):

Major General J.C. Breckinridge/2-Command
Points.

Brigadier General J. Echols/4-Command
Radius/1-Rally Point/(4)-Promotion
Rating/Echols Replacement/3-Command
Radius/0-Rally Point.

22nd Virginia Infantry Regiment/Echols/R3-
Strength/4-Morale.

23rd Virginia Infantry Regiment/Echols/R3-
Strength/4-Morale.

26th Virginia Infantry Regiment/Echols/R2-
Strength/4-Morale.

Brigadier General G.C. Wharton/5-Command
Radius/1-Rally Point/(5)-Promotion
Rating/Wharton's Replacement/3-Command
Radius/0-Rally Point.

45th Virginia Infantry Regiment/Wharton/R3-
Strength/4-Morale.

51st Virginia Infantry Regiment/Wharton/R3-
Strength/4-Morale.

30th Virginia Infantry Battalion/Wharton/R1-
Strength/4-Morale.

Brigadier General J.C. Vaughn/4-Command
Radius/1-Rally Point/(3)-Promotion
Rating/Vaughn's Replacement/3-Command
Radius/0-Rally Point.

Dismounted Cavalry Detachment/Vaughn/R3-
Strength/3-Morale.

Dismounted Cavalry Detachment/Vaughn/R2-
Strength/3-Morale.

Dismounted Cavalry Detachment/Vaughn/R2-
Strength/3-Morale.

(Note: The Confederate player should assign an arbitrary identification number to the three detachments of Vaughn's Brigade in order to differentiate them.)

1*. The Confederate Limited Initiative rating for Breckinridge's command is "4."

2. The Brigade Combat Effectiveness ratings for the Confederate reinforcements are as follows: Echols-4 of 8, Wharton-4 of 7, Vaughn-3 of 7.

3. In this scenario, Breckinridge's units are placed on the Harper's Ferry Road in column formation anywhere north of hex 3518 at the start of the game. These units may not be moved unless the Union player crosses the Monocacy River or the Confederate player successfully rolls a die to commit them. The Confederate player may roll a die to attempt to commit Breckinridge's troops during any Confederate Final Command Phase after which at least one Confederate division has reached Confederate Limited Initiative. If only one Confederate division has reached CLI, a die roll of "1" or "2" successfully commits Breckinridge's command. If two Confederate divisions have reached CLI, a die roll of "1" through "4" commits Breckinridge's command. If three Confederate divisions have reached CLI, then

Breckinridge's command is automatically committed.

4. The die roll to commit Breckinridge's command is optional at the discretion of the Confederate player. Once he attempts a first die roll for commitment, though, he must continue to roll the die every Confederate final command phase.

5. Breckinridge's units may be moved in the next Confederate Movement Phase after commitment.

6. There is a penalty in victory points for attempting to commit Breckinridge's command. This penalty is three points per turn remaining in the game after a successful die roll for commitment of these reinforcements.

7. If Breckinridge becomes a casualty, he is not replaced.

8. If Early becomes a casualty, Breckinridge is promoted and replaces Early and Breckinridge is not replaced.

9. If both Breckinridge and Early are casualties, use the standard rules for promotions.

10. Breckinridge's command has no division commander. Breckinridge himself may be used like Early (i.e., lend command points, rally units, and negate CLI), but only for the units in his command and for Gordon's Division. Breckinridge may not function in any way with Ramseur's or Rodes' Divisions.

11. The commitment of Breckinridge does not change Early's capabilities in any way except that Breckinridge and Early may not both lend command points to the same commander in the same turn.

12. Once committed, Breckinridge's units are counted normally for victory purposes. If they are not committed, they do not count in Confederate victory point calculations.

Optional Rules

Several of the sources used for *Drive on Washington* disagree on certain points. At least three of these sources, including the *Official Records*, have different Orders of Battle for the Union artillery units than represented in *Drive on Washington*. Thus, if both players agree, the Order of Battle for Union troops should be modified as follows. All optional rules should be used together.

1. The 9th New York Heavy Artillery Regiment should be deleted from the game as artillery and a counter for its deployment as infantry should be made to read: 9th New York/McClennan/R3-Strength/4-Morale.

2. If the 9th New York is used as infantry as above, the BCE rating for McClennan's Brigade become 11 of 18. If the Union reinforcements are later received, McClennan's Brigade BCE rating becomes 18 of 29.

3. According to both Captain Alexander (the commander of the Baltimore Battery) and General Wallace, the Baltimore Battery had only 6 guns instead of 8 as in the game. Therefore, if both players agree, change both the Baltimore Md. Battery A and B to 3 guns each.

"SO PROFUSE WAS THE FLOW OF BLOOD..."

Historical Overview

By mid-June of 1864, with Federals before Petersburg, Lee needed to force Grant into either letting up some pressure in that area, or to lure him into rash Cold Harbor-like assaults there. On June 28, Major General Jubal Early, with the II Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, left Staunton, in the upper Shenandoah Valley, with instructions from Lee to cause, by threatening Washington, as much consternation as possible among Federal authorities. By 2 July, Early was already at Winchester, in the lower Valley, driving in feeble opposition under Major General Franz Sigel, who retreated into Harper's Ferry.

July 3-5 was spent demonstrating against Harper's Ferry, collecting food, awaiting a shipment of shoes (!) and preparing to cross the Potomac. On 5 July, Early crossed at Shepherdstown, bypassing Harper's Ferry, which was too strong to take. From 6 to 8 July, he moved into Hagerstown, through the passes in Catoctin Mountain and on into Frederick, Maryland, only two days march from Washington.

McCausland's cavalry command levied \$20,000 on Hagerstown as reparations for Federal depredations in the Valley by Major General David Hunter earlier that summer. The Confederates demanded a further \$200,000 from Frederick.

By the 8th of July, Washington was in an uproar because of the raid, as it was then unclear whether Early's force was a substantial part, or only a small portion, of Lee's Army. On this day, the only thing blocking the Confederates' way on the banks of the Monocacy River was a pick-up brigade under Major General Lew Wallace, plus the timely arrival of a division from the Petersburg lines.

Wallace had a difficult assignment: with a force of Maryland militia and other garrison troops from Baltimore and Washington (some outside his technical jurisdiction) plus one battery, he was expected to delay a corps of seasoned veterans. Fortunately for him, a division from the VI Corps of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Brigadier General James Ricketts, had embarked on 6 July from the Petersburg area and arrived in Baltimore on the 7th and 8th. Ricketts, not finding Wallace there, had the initiative to commandeer rail transportation and to rush his command to the Monocacy River just in time to man the entrenchments guarding the main crossings on the evening of the 8th. (Several regiments did not arrive in time

to take part in the battle; this was a source of some consternation to Wallace throughout the next day — something of a repetition of the situation he had put Grant through at Shiloh two years earlier!) There, Wallace made his arrangements for the next morning's assault he knew would come, as the Confederates were already driving his Maryland Brigade through Frederick toward the river.

The Maryland (First Separate) Brigade, under Brigadier General Erastus Tyler, was to guard the crossings on the north (right) end of the line. For this purpose, Wallace could spare him only half of the Baltimore (Md.) Battery, three 3-inch rifles. Tyler was told to hold the crossings to the Baltimore road at all hazards, as that was where the Federals would have to retreat. Wallace believed, quite correctly, that Early would throw his main assault at the Union left, in order to get on the main road to Washington. He knew that he could not stop Early, but wanted to delay his advance for at least half a day to keep him from getting 15 miles closer to Washington by nightfall.

Lt. Colonel D.R. Clendenin's small brigade of cavalry was given the impossible task of not only skirmishing with the Rebels fanning out from Frederick, but also watching the fords below Monocacy Junction. Ricketts, with his veterans, was to entrench himself at the Monocacy Junction crossings (the wooden bridge and the iron railroad bridge) and to contest the main assaults. He was given the other half of the Baltimore (Md.) Battery (three 3-inch rifles) for support, while there was one 24-pounder howitzer set up by a blockhouse at the eastern end of the wooden bridge to cover the approaches to the bridges. Captain F.W. Alexander, commander of the Baltimore (Md.) Battery, reported that an additional (12-pounder) "mountain howitzer" was also dragged away in the subsequent retreat, but where it was used is unknown. This mountain howitzer was not mentioned in Wallace's report, while Rickett's report has been lost.

Early on the 9th of July the Confederates moved out of Frederick. A portion of the Rebel command remained in the city in order to collect the \$200,000 in reparations. The rest of Early's infantry fanned out beyond the city toward the crossings of the Monocacy River. On the outskirts of the city, they met Federal skirmishers supported by a section of guns, which they steadily pushed toward the river. Early had most of his command deploy in line of battle, with Rodes' division heading toward the stone bridge on the Baltimore road, Ramseur's toward the main crossings on the direct road to Washington at Monocacy Junction, and

Gordon's division searching for a way to cross lower down the river to outflank the entrenchments which were found covering the Junction. Sixteen pieces of artillery supported the Confederate right, and were soon engaged by the howitzer at the main crossing, plus some smaller guns. Breckinridge's command, with the trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the Junction.

Early's division commanders found themselves much delayed in finding easy crossings, due to vigorous Federal skirmishing, so Early had to make an examination in person to find a crossing from which to flank the enemy position. While he was engaged in this reconnaissance, he discovered McCausland (whose cavalry had just arrived from the Hagerstown and Catoctin Mountain area) in the act of crossing the river with his brigade about 9:30 at a ford below Monocacy Junction. As soon as he crossed, he dismounted his men and advanced rapidly against the Union left held by part of Clendenin's cavalry, which was soon reinforced by part of Rickett's division (McClennan's brigade). Orders were immediately sent to Major General John C. Breckinridge to move up rapidly with Gordon's division to McCausland's assistance. Major General John B. Gordon crossed about 10:30, overrunning the forces which were manning Wallace's first line of defense at the advance fence.

The Confederates had a great deal of trouble keeping their brigades in formation due to bales piled around in the fields they had to cross. In addition, the fences crossing the fields were difficult to traverse. When units tried to climb the fences, they sustained heavy casualties. Gordon was temporarily stalled. He succeeded in reforming his division in a patch of heavy woodland in the middle of the fields after driving the defenders from the first fence. He then carried out a series of assaults on the second fence line, but this time most of Ricketts' division had been diverted to the Union left, stiffening resistance.

The second fence was fiercely contested, along with the little stream behind it, to the point that Early wrote, "So profuse was the flow of blood from the killed and wounded...that it reddened the stream for more than one hundred yards below." The pressure on the Union position on the left was too much, for in addition to Gordon's attack, Confederate artillery posted near the Junction, west of the river, had devastating enfilade fire on the Federals at the fences. Echols' division, the other half of Breckinridge's command which had been left to guard the trains, was ordered up during the engagement but was not needed.

Ricketts had to order most of his other brigade (Truex's) out of the entrenchments in order to stem Early's assaults, forcing Ricketts to order the burning of the wooden bridge across the river around 1:30 (stranding some of his own skirmishers on the west bank), but it was too late, and the pressure too great. Wallace, around 4:00, ordered Ricketts to withdraw his division northward to the Baltimore road for a general retreat to that city. This uncovered the railroad bridge, allowing Ramseur's division to cross. The Federals lost a substantial number of prisoners in this withdrawal, but no guns were lost. Their casualties were reported as 98 killed, 594 wounded and 1188 missing out of a total strength of 8750 on the field. They had delayed the Rebels for eight hours.

Early reported his losses between 600 and 700, out of about 8,000 engaged, but this is subject to serious dispute, as Gordon had reported at least that many casualties in his division alone, in the furious assaults across the fields and fences on the Federal left.

Tyler's First Separate Brigade, having kept Major General Robert Rodes from forcing a crossing at the stone bridge, acted as the rear-guard during the retreat to Baltimore.

Rodes finally crossed, snaring some of the rear-guard. Early did not pursue, but spent the rest of the evening caring for wounded, burying the dead, bringing his trains over the river and preparing for the forced march towards Washington the next morning. The Rebels never got their reparations from Frederick, but did find an ample supply of a great delicacy — ice cream — upon which they proceeded to gorge themselves.

Early was in front of Ft. Stevens, a few miles north of the Capital, two days after the battle, on the 11th. Reconnaissance soon told him that the rest of the Federal VI Corps had arrived in the Washington lines, as well as the XIX Corps, also just arrived from New Orleans after being diverted from the Virginia Peninsula.

Early decided to withdraw to Virginia, his mission partially accomplished: he had diverted Union forces from the vicinity of Richmond-Petersburg, thus relieving some pressure there. However, the Federals were now dead serious about eliminating the possibility of this type of raid in the future. Wright's VI Corps, Emory's XIX Corps, and Hunter's former command (the future VIII Corps) now arriving in the Harper's Ferry region, under George Crook, were soon to become the Army of the Shenandoah under General Phil Sheridan. ■■

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4. Also according to both Alexander and Wallace, the Union had a 24-pounder howitzer located in the trenches at the end of the Wooden Bridge. If agreed upon by both players, make a counter for one 24-pounder and place it in hex 2214 with crew at the start of the game. However, this howitzer has no limber and cannot be moved unless a limber is sent from either the Baltimore Md. A or B. The limber must move from the Baltimore Md. unit, sending it to hex 2214 before the 24-pounder can be limbered and moved. A counter must be made for this limber. Sending such a limber does not affect in any way the movement of the Baltimore Md. A or B.

5. The counter for the 24-pounder is an HB 1. The chart for its attack strength and range can be taken from *Bloody April* or the chart for the Mountain Howitzers in *Drive on Washington* can be used as they are essentially the same.

Erratum

The 81st Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment should be labeled the 87th.

Notes on Research

Since the Battle of the Monocacy was a relatively minor episode in the Civil War, there is comparatively little primary and secondary material available about the battle. What is available is fraught with the usual contradictions, omissions, and inaccuracies that are typical of the period. Thus, it is impossible to state with absolute accuracy the composition of certain units on the battlefield.

An excellent case in point is the question of the Union artillery. At least three normally reliable sources state or clearly imply that the 9th New York Heavy Artillery Regiment was deployed without guns and used as infantry in this battle, as it was in several other battles. (However, another part of the 9th New York was used as artillery but it was not present at Monocacy.) Wallace himself in his official report of the battle mentions that he had 7 guns, 6 with the Baltimore Md. Battery and the lone 24-pounder in the trenches. This is confirmed by Captain Alexander's official report. Yet Alexander also mentions dragging from the battlefield one mountain howitzer that is mentioned nowhere in the other sources. Where was it? What did it do? Whose command did it belong to? These questions are impossible to answer from the source material used for this article.

Likewise, the question of Breckinridge's "command" as given in the extra scenario was quite difficult to track down. Breckinridge had been the Shenandoah Valley commander since March of 1864. When Early arrived in the Valley with II Corps, he attached Breckinridge's "command" for the raid on Washington. Because of Breckinridge's rank and prestige, he had to be given a larger command within Early's organization, so he was assigned control over Gordon's Division as well as his own command, which (as far as it is possible to tell) was assigned to Echols. Breckinridge's

"command" at the Monocacy thus consisted of Gordon's Division plus the brigades of Echols, Wharton, and Vaughn, the last being dismounted cavalry.

It is impossible to determine from these sources whether Vaughn himself was present on the battlefield. At least one source shows Vaughn's brigade commanded by an officer named Patton. (Perhaps this was an earlier incarnation of General George Patton.) Breckinridge's "command" — other than Gordon's Division — had a strength of approximately 2200 men. All of this serves only as a warning to those who would accept the optional rules and the extra scenario as gospel. These are based on the best sources and the best guesses that the authors could agree upon, and are certainly not definitive.

Sources

The following material was used as sources for this article.

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